This book fills the need for a broad, historically sophisticated understanding of Pakistan, a country at fifty which is understood by many in the West only in terms . Pakistan, a modern history. byIan Talbot. Publication date For print- disabled users. Borrow this book to access EPUB and PDF files. - Ebook download as PDF File .pdf ) or view presentation slides online.

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Pakistan a Modern History by Ian Talbot - Ebook download as PDF File .pdf), Text File .txt) or read book online. Pakistan: a modern history (2nd revised edition). Book · September with Reads. Cite this publication. Ian Talbot at University of Southampton · Ian. Pakistan, A Modern History by Ian Talbot 3. Democracy and To open them, convert to pdf or download and install a djvu file viewer. One such.

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Lists with This Book. This book is not yet featured on Listopia. Community Reviews. Showing Rating details. Sort order. Feb 18, Mehwish Mughal rated it liked it Shelves: This book is divided into 4 parts.

From colonial rule to the inception of Pakistan to losing East-Pakistan Bangladesh roughly makes up the first part of the book. Part 2 paints a grim picture of obliterated democracy in the very early days of Pakistan's birth. Part 3 creates the charismatic leader Shaheed Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and destroys him. It also covers "Zia's" Islamisation of Pakistan. The last part highlights the political struggle of power between Nawaz Sharif and Shaheed Benazir Bhutt This book is divided into 4 parts.

The last part highlights the political struggle of power between Nawaz Sharif and Shaheed Benazir Bhutto. Ian Talbot's book is a complete, dense and a well-researched analysis of Pakistan. There is uneven distribution of resources at the time of birth, a bloody migration, withheld resources, identity confusion, military coups, constitution suspensions, unfulfilled promises, assassinations, involvements of puppeteers, the attractive geopolitical vantage points, radicalization, economic challenges, social challenges, and environmental challenges etc.

Pakistan's past is bleak but there is hope of converting the "failed promise" of to something fruitful according to the historian. Nov 28, Sania Sufi rated it it was amazing. View 1 comment. Jun 29, Mitul Choksi rated it really liked it Recommends it for: Researchers on Pakistan. This book is a very well written book. It goes into tremendous detail regarding the Pakistan movement in British India and also the birth and rise of Pakistan as a modern nation state.

The only drawback of this book is that it uses a lot of abbreviations. Except that, this book is a good one. Jun 27, Chatgemini rated it really liked it. For an Indian, this book fulfills to a large extent the void that exists about adequate information about the growth of Pakistan as a nation. Tuesday, August 29, Originally Posted by zealotx7.

Originally Posted by mrarsalankhan. Dear please stop posting irrelevant stuff.

Nobody have any sort of interest in your old or new account, and i think you should leave it too. The soul purpose here is to share the knowledge one have with the other members. I hope, from now on you will leave your old account story and will move forward. Please, abide by the rules. Saturday, October 07, Does anyone have The secret book in soft form??? Plz send me or give link to download. BB code is On. Smilies are On. Trackbacks are On. Pingbacks are On. Refbacks are On. Forum Rules.

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User Name. Remember Me? Share Thread: Page 1 of 2. Thread Tools. Sarmad 2 Junior Member. Join Date: Jun Posts: All of the Punjab's foreign trade is transported through the latter region, the petroleum on which it depends also comes from the port and refineries of Karachi. Despite Punjab's dominance within the Pakistani economy liS a whole, Karachi plays a vital role in its functioning. It is clear even from this brief overview that historical and regional inheritances along with the legacy of the freedom struggle itself provide lin important insight into Pakistan's post-independence politics.

The state's contested national identity, uneven development, bureaucratic nuthoritarianism and imbalance between a weak civil society and dominant military can all be traced to the colonial era. In stating this argument however, it is important not to ignore earlier historical influences. The British system of governance with its centralised administrative structure and the political co-option of local elites was based on Mughal practice.

Resistance to obscurantist religious authority is associated not just with nineteenth-century Islamic modernism, but with the earlier writings of Varis Shah ? Another Sufi, Shah Inayat of Jhok who distributed land to the downtrodden peasants of Sindh and was martyred in January reveals a long established tradition of social activism and resistance to state oppression. The rebellion in Sindh ugainst Zia's regime was not only heir to this, but drew inspiration. The Punjabi PPP leader and Interior Minister in Benazir Bhutto's first administration, Aitzaz Ahsan'" has recently seized on such traditions to argue that the creation of Pakistan was not an historical aberration or the outcome of colonial divide and rule policies as Indian nationalist historiography has claimed; it was rather the culmination of a longestablished cultural and historical Indus tradition which has moulded the Pakistani personality as distinct from the Indian.

The attempt on the eve of the fiftieth anniversary of the British departure to establish a Pakistani identity rooted in the soil and history rather than in an 'obscurantist mould' was in itself interesting. The leading American analyst, Selig Harrison refutes such 'ingenuity' and understands Pakistan's post-independence political instability partly in terms of the 'artificiality' of the Pakistan state. Religion alone has proved an insufficient means of building a nation out of disparate ethnic groups who had never previously coexisted except under colonialism.

He points out that during the Mughal era, Punjab was an outlying province and the Pushtuns and Baloch were pitted against the authorities in Delhi. Moreover, the Punjabis' contemporary ethnic assertiveness could be linked with their historical memory of rule by Afghan, Sikh and British outsiders. A striking change in the half century since independence seldom remarked upon is the establishment of a large Pakistani overseas community with a range of transnational linkages with the 'homeland'.

The seat's holder is appointed by the Aznd Kashmir Prime Minister. Ellis and Z. Khan, 'Partition and Kashmir: Paper presented to 14th Europcnn conference on 'Modern South. Better documented discontinuities include the accelerated postcolonial ethnicisation of Sindh' s politics as a result both of the preferential policies in the federal public employment sector from onwards lind the acceleration of Punjabi and Pushtun immigration in the Zia era.

The task of nation building in Pakistan has been hampered not only by unresolved conflicts between regional, religious and nationalist identity inherited from the freedom movement, but by the attempts of successive martial law regimes to forcibly impose a national identity ruther than achieve it by consensus. Furthermore, ethno-nationalist movements have not been rooted in historically derived immutable traits lind identities despite the claims of primordialists , but rather on the shifting sands of political strategies and circumstances.

Increasing Baloch lind Pushtun access to federal levers of power during the past two decades has defused earlier regionalist movements. The Pakistan state hus thus been unstable not just because of its inheritances from the colonial era; it is in fact precisely the interplay between these and the response of the power elites to rapid socio-economic change within the country and to political developments worldwide, especially the "rowing strategic asymmetry in the subcontinent, which hold the key to understanding Pakistan's dilemmas at the close of the twentieth century.

Our opening chapter provides the reader with both an introduction to Pakistan's geopolitical, economic and social setting and an overview of the changes and challenges since the separation of Bangladesh in lIn I. Chapter 2 focuses on the administrative, economic and political legacies of British rule in the regions which were to form Pakistan, while Chapter 3 examines the character and legacies of the Pakistan movement.

This is followed by a brief study of the seemingly insurmountable problems which faced Pakistan on its creation. Two key 'Illest ions are raised. How was Pakistan able to overcome the difficulties which threatened to strangle it at birth? And in what ways did the crisis management of influence the state's future political trajeclory?

Chapter 5 surveys the chaotic political period which culminated III the military coup of It draws out both the causes and significance Ill' the Muslim League's collapse and also looks at the establishment Ill' the close strategic ties with the United States.

There then follows assessment of the successes and ultimate failures of the Ayub era. The Bangladesh breakaway is analysed in Chapter 7 in terms of both the depoliticisation and economic imbalances of the Ayub era and East Bengal's longer term history.

Chapter 8 sets the ultimate failure of the populist interlude of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in its regional and international historical context. Particular attention is drawn to the regime's economic and political reforms and to centre-province relations.

Pakistan A Modern History By Ian Talbot

The next chapter examines Zia's Pakistan and its legacy for the contemporary period, focusing on both the Islamisation process and the changing international context.

The final two chapters seek to explain why democratisation in Pakistan since has gone hand in hand with a growing crisis of governability. The historic roots of Pakistan's zero-sum politics are examined along with the constraints placed upon the state by the late-twentieth-century new world order and economic globalisation.

MuCh oftlu:!. Pakistan's resulting ties with America and, to a much smaller extent, with China have profoundly influenced its internal politics. Pakistan's geopolitical situation in the new world order of the early s seemed more favourable than at any period since the secession of East Pakistan. The military threat of the former Soviet Union had been removed and India could no longer rely on it for diplomatic and economic assistance or for supplies of cheap weapons.

The emergence of the six Central Asian republics further opened up the possibility of economic, cultural and commercial links. It seemed as though this was about to be realised early in following a series of agreements on troop movements and the opening of air corridors. Pakistan's hopes dissolved in the chaos of post-communist Afghanistan and in the intensification of the cold war with India.

The turbulence in Afghanistan threatened not only an overspilling of violence into the Pushtun areas of the Frontier, but closed off the trade route from Central Asia to the Arabian Sea at Karachi.

Iran increasingly emerged as an alternative trade outlet. The unofficial Pakistani support for the Taliban movement in Afghanistan must be viewed in the light of trade as much as Islamic policy. New Delhi continuously claimed that Pakistan was waging a covert war in Kashmir and that its Inter Services Intelligence Agency lSI had planted the bombs which killed people in Bombay in March The continued deterioration of relations in culminated in the closure of the two country's consulates in Bombay and Karachi respectively.

This exacerbated the effect of the loss of the US military prop. But it has made only limited headway in comparison with regional organisations elsewhere in the world, not just because of Indo-Pakistan suspicions, but also tensions between India and Sri Lanka and even India and Nepal.

The Politics of Confrontation', Asian Survey 35, no. Winners and Losers', Asian Survey 35, I no. In socio-economicterllls Pakistan can bebest typified as apopulous, rapidlygrowing middle income country in.

Arable land stIll renlains tlie principal natural resource with 25 per cent Of the country's total area under cultivation thanks to one of the most extensive irrigation systems in the world. However, social welfare has lagged behind economic growth, bringing--wTih it marked rural-urban and gender disparities.

Again, as in many developing countries, external and internal budget deficits are high. The country's population was estimated at millioIl in with an annual increase of 3 per cent, one of the highest in the world.

Rapid rates of economic growth 6.

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Social welfare has lagged behind Pakistan's considerable economic progress since independence. This is demonstrated most starkly by such figures as 26 per cent literacy and an infant mortality rate of 97 out of births in Life expectancy stands at fifty-nine for both men and women. Gender inequalities are particularly marked in education where only 11 per cent of Pakistani women are literate and only a tenth of school-age girls in the countryside receive education. Despite attempts at diversification, cotton textiles and clothing account foraDout 50 per cent of all exports.

By t hey appeared increasingly unwilling to bail Pakistan out of its debt. The crisis which coincided with the dismissal of Benazir Bhutto's second government was narrowly averted byrecourse to short term high interest. However its Islam is not monolithic or for that matter monochrome, with significant sectarian differences and a lively Sufi tradition. Outside the tribal areas, the main social networks are formed by biraderis and Sufi brotherhoods.

The countryside, especially in Sindh and southwestern Punjab, is marked by uneven feudal power relationships. Society is strictly patriarchal.

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Competing with these social forces and identities in political mobilisation have been ethnic loyalties. These are grounded in both linguistic and cultural inheritances and a sense that Punjabis have controlled the Pakistan state apparatus to the disadvantage of others.

Together all these influences, many of which were reinforced during the period of colonial rule, have established a political culture which is inimical to the growth of a participant democracy.

In keeping with the major concerns of this work, special attention will be paid in this chapter both to the inheritances from the colonial state and the changes brought about by the separation of East Pakistan in The chapter will conclude by examining Pakistan's postindependence socio-economic development. East Bengal, which until comprised one-sixth of Pakistan's total area, was a monsoon-saturated delta land which extended some miles north of the Bay of Bengal.

Most of the province was barely above sea-level, broken only by a narrow band of hills along the Burmese border. It contrasted with West Pakistan not only in topography and climate, but in population density and religious composition. East Pakistan contained over half of the state's total population some 45 million in , the 1,plus people per square mile making it one of the most densely settled regions of the world.

Even in the most thickly populated rural areas of West Pakistan, the density was no more than people per square mile. While just under 3 per cent of West Pakistan's population was non-Muslim according to the Census, the figure for the eastern wing was 23 per cent.

The relative sizes of the two wings' minority populations inevitably influenced responses to the issue of Islamisation. This distance from the seat of national power compounded the problem of forging a sense of national identity which could reach across regional, linguistic and religious difIerences.

The economic imbalances between West and East Pakistan uiso hindered national integration.. Economies of scale and the siting of the federal capital Tn West Pakistan perpetuated the inter-wing imbalance, and as the result there were destabilising political repercussions. Peasant proprietors predominated in East Bengal where just under a half of the cultivable area was owned by families having 5 acres or Icss.

Sindh and parts of the Punjab possessed large landed estates. Differing political priorities and styles emanated from the societies of the eastern and western wings. The Bengalis' more radical and democratic urges were denied in the realm of national politics because their demographic majority was converted to an equality with the less progresHive West Pakistan under the principle of parity enshrined in the lind Constitutions.

The Bengali elites' sense of marginalisation is clearly displayed in the following quotation from a speech by Ataur Rahman Khan during II debate in the Constituent Assembly early in I did not feel as much when I went to Zurich, til Geneva Language has acted as an important marker of identity and source Ill' political mobilisation in South Asia as is evidenced, for example, hy the Telegu movement in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh und the Dravidian movement and rise of the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam in Tamil Nadu.

Language politics rest first on cultural. H Cited in I. Malik, State and Civil Society in Pakistan: Muslim separatism in colonial India was rooted of course in the Urdu-Hindi controversy in the United Provinces UP at the beginning of this century. From the time of Muhsin al-Mulk's foundation of an Urdu Defence Association in onwards, the Urdu language became a major symbol of Muslim political identity.

He opined that 'Pakistan has been created because of the demand of a hundred million Muslims in this subcontinent and the language of a hundred million Muslims is Urdu. J It is necessary for a nation to have one language and that language can only be Urdu and no other language.

Attempts at strengthening Urdu as part of the nation-building enterprise proved counterproductive as was demonstrated most clearly in East Bengal. Even after , as Table 1. In fact Balochi existed only as an oral language until after independence and was widely regarded as a dialect of Persian. P From the s onwards it was established as a literary.

Zaheer, The Separation of East Pakistan: This decision, which alienated Bengalis, was taken because of the symbolic role it had acquired in the growth of Muslim separatism in India. Its relationship with the regional languages can be further examined in Y. Mitha, 'Linguistic Nationalism in Pakistan: Thesis, University of Sussex, Ahmed, 'Identity and Ideology in Pakistan: Jahani, 'Poetry and Politics: Titus ed. In the early s Urdu finally emerged as a major political rallying point, but for a mohajir ethnic identity rather than Pakistani nationalism.

Rahman, 'Language and Politics in a Pakistan Province: The Sindhi language Movement', Asian Survey 35, no. Language has formed an important element in Sindhi identity, along with territory and cultural traditions relating to dress - especially the wearing of the ajrak shawl of Sindhi design , poetry and Sufism.

Indeed it was Sufi poems kafi which helped to establish linguistic traditions, despite their ancient origins. During the era of British rule Sindhi was standardised in the Arabic script, formerly having also been written in Nagri and Gurumukhi.

Sindhi is today the most developed regional language in Pakistan. As befits a Muslim state created in the name of religion, Islam has exerted a major influence on Pakistani politics. What has been more striking is its divisive impact. Sectarian violence has become endemic in parts of Punjab. In order to make sense of the complex interaction between Islam and Pakistani politics, it is necessary to understand the conflicting Islamic ideological responses to the eighteenth-century decline of Muslim power in north India.

Islamic revivalism owes its roots to the writings of Shah Waliullah although modern Islamist understanding was formulated by Syed Abul Ala Maududi Both of these themes will be outlined here, in preparation for a fuller treatment in later chapters. We can broadly identify four major responses to the crisis brought on by the loss of Muslim political power and the rise of an alien Christian rule.

These are modernism, reformism, traditionalism and Islamism, often called fundamentalism. The institutions and ideas which they forged during the colonial era continue to profoundly influence Pakistani society and politics, as does their history of confrontation.

Pakistan: A Modern History

During the Zia era this was intensified as well as externalised towards the Shia and non-Muslim minorities. The modernist reformism of the Aligarh movement possessed a twofold aim; first to encourage Muslims to engage with Western scientific thought and second to reconcile the Islamic concept of the sovereignty of God with the nation state. The Pakistan demand was thus very much an Aligarh enterprise. It was opposed by both Deobandi reformists and Jamaat-i-Islami supporters.

The former were not prepared to compromise Islamic law by modernist reasoning and understanding, although they were in many cases unconcerned with the politics of the colonial state.

Islamists were opposed to the creation of Pakistan, seeing the establishment of a secular Muslim nation-state as blasphemous. Their disquiet had been increased by Jinnah's incorporation of the notion of discretion in choosing between Islamic law and customary law during the passage of the Muslim Personal Law Bill in the Central Legislature in Even at this juncture however the perpetual disunity in the ranks of the 'ulama undermined their attempts to transform Pakistan into an 'ideological state'.

In addition to the Sunni-Shia divide, 17 there has always. From the outset, it emphasised education and scriptualism. See B.

Pakistan, a modern history

Metcalf, Islamic revival in British India: Deoband, Princeton, Smith ed. The former uphold the 'traditional' Islam of pir and shrine, the latter represent the orthodox revivalist movement which aimed at purifying Indian Islam from such 'un-Islamic' practices. The Barelvis, unlike the Deobandis hud unequivocally supported the Pakistan movement. Unlike the n it distanced itself from the Zia regime from the outset.

Both modernists and those steeped in Sufi tradition have expressed hostility to attempts to create a 'mullahocracy' in Pakistan. The uneducated and hypocritical mullah has emerged as a stereotype in Pakistani literature and in the folklore of the region. The pirs' popular religious influence, however, provides them with immense moral and temporal authority, and many have also acquired large landholdings.

Their inlluence is rooted in the belief that they have inherited baraka religious charisma believed to be transmitted by a saint to his descendants and his shrine from their ancestors - the Sufi saints who since the eleventh century had played a major role in the region's conversion to Islam. Relations between the 'ulama, the custodians of Islamic orthodoxy, lind the pirs have been uneasy. The reformist 'ulama of the Deobandi lind Ahl-i-Hadith movements from the second half of the nineteenth century onwards unequivocally condemned the 'un-Islamic' practices of saint worship at the shrines.

While one should not exaggerate the differences between pirs and 'ulama - an individual could be both an Islamic scholar and a mystic - the two groups have clashed both religiously and in their attitude to the role of Islam in the state. The Deobandi alim Shabbir Ahmad Uthmani was a notable exception. His followers supported the Pakistan demand through the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam which was founded in Calcutta in November Akhtar, 'Pakistan Since Independence: The Political role of the Ulema', unpubJ.

The Pirs! Talbot, Punjab and the Raj, New Delhi, The mass mobilisation of Muslims in would not have been possible without the support of the pirs. The 'ulama lacked th.

Ayub Khan, despite his modernist outlook, sought their support because they provided religious fire-breaks from the incandescent attacks of Islamist groups and parties such as the JI. The pirs grouped in the J amiat-i-Mashaikh threw their weight behind him in the presidential elections.

The biraderi brotherhood, kinship group forms an important locus of political authority especially in the central areas of the Punjab. Patrilineal descent lies at the heart of the biraderi as a social institution although its boundaries vary with marriage connections, bonds of reciprocal obligation and political structures. Biraderi solidarity has appeared strongest among independent peasant proprietors, although 'tribal' and landed elites deploy its idiom for political mobilisation.

Indeed since the colonial era, biraderi identity has played a crucial role in local electoral politics. Although the Muslim League stressed an Islamic identity which transcended the primordial allegiance to the biraderi, it could not ignore its political salience in the Punjab elections which held the key to the creation of Pakistan. V Biraderi influence has continued since independence because of weak party institutionalisation in the localities.

Its high point was in fact reached in the 'partyless' elections. However, the unequal rural power relationships inherent in the feudal system have, in the eyes of some scholars, been even more int1uential in shaping Pakistani politics than Islam or biraderi loyalties.

A vast economic and social gulf exists between the landholding elite and the rural masses. Indeed the continued power of the feudal elite. Only Pir Taunsa supported Fatima Jinnah who opposed him in the election. See S. Donnan and P. Werbner eds , Economy and Culture in Pakistan Basingstoke, , pp. IN seen as Pakistan's bane by the professional classes. P The state's existence is owed neverthless to the Muslim League's strategic alliances with the large landholders.

During Pakistan's opening turbulent decades, the landlords exerted a dominant influence which prevented effective lund reform and hindered economic and political development within the countryside. The full sway of the landlords' power was displayed III provincial politics, but their predominance was also reflected in uurional politics.

In the and National Assemblies landlords uccounted for 58 out of 96 and 34 out of 82 members respectively. It could also be used to veto administrative and socio-economic reform in the localities.

Votes were sought in an atmosphere of both 'coercive localism' and extravagant display. Critics of Pakistani 'feudalism' have produced a threefold charge sheet arising from the landholders' predominance: As the causes of the secession are examined later, it is suffitient merely to draw attention here to its main demographic, religious and political legacies before turning to the rapid socio-economic change of the past two decades.

The secession of East Pakistan reinforced Punjabi domination of the state. Table 1. The region' s. B For a typical assessment see LH. Consequently rigid adherence to a policy or a measure is likely to make politicians less available for office.

Callard, Pakistan: A Political Study London, t p, Karachi Karachi 5, Baxter et al. Boulder, p. Ilf factor,27 and OmarNoman has similarly linked the political tranquility of the Punjab during the Zia era to the prosperity arising from migrants' remittances.

Its absence in the interior of Sindh, which sent no migrants to the Gulf, undoubtedly contributed to the sense of relative deprivation which fuelled the anti-Zia protests.

Punjab's big brother status in the post Pakistan state has been a cause of increasing resentment among Sindhi, Baloch, Pushtun and mohajir nationalists. Piscatori, 'Asian Islam:.

International Linkages and their Impact on International Relations' in 1. Esposito ed. Religion, Politics and Society New York, , p. Post ethnic clashes have been particularly bitter in Balochistan Sindh. Indeed it might be argued that the genocide unleashed in Pakistan in made later episodes of state repression in these winces more politically acceptable. What is most chilling in such. Parallels with the Nazi Holocaust immediately. While its perpetrators were brought to trial, the 'butcher' Dhaka, Lieutenant-General Tikka Khan, was to be rapidly rehabilitated promoted in post Pakistan.

State terrorism in the name of [onul security thereafter secured a political legitimacy with profound. The state's violent response to ethno-regional grievances and identities rooted in what has been termed a 'fragility syndrome' in the thinking thc ruling elites. It is based on a sense of increased insecurity vis-a-vis lin lind on the fear that ethno-nationalist movements in such provinces Sil1dh, Balochistan and the Frontier may follow the Bengali precedent.

These anxieties have encouraged lespread support in the political establishment for the acquisition nuclear weapons, as demonstrated in May Regarding Islamisation, the separation of East Pakistan contributed the trend in three ways: Ntrcngthened anti-Hindu and anti-Indian sentiment because of the Icnce given to conspiracy thesis interpretations of East Bengal's on; third it demolished the 'two nation theory', the secular stani nationalist ideology, thereby reinforcing Islam as an ideological.

These trends were encouraged by the oil boom the Gulf and by the Iranian revolution and Afghan jihad. The s backwash effects included increased militancy and the growth II 'kalashnikov culture'. Trade and investment have? See especially Chapters J, Piscatori, 'Asian Islam: P However, culturally and not le in security terms, Pakistan could not fully free itself from its SOl Asia moorings even if it wanted to.

Adapted from unpublished data, Census Organisation of Pakistan , cited in C. Baxter et , Government and Politics in South Asia, p. The interaction between Islam and politics during the Zia era forn a principal focus of Chapter 9. Yet we must note here that intolerant and sectarian violence have become part and parcel of contemporai Pakistani culture. Seventy-eight people were killed in Jhang alone from as a result of such clashes. Muslim extremists' use of the legal cover provided by Section of the Penal Code" to persecute non-Muslims has contributed t.

In October the Federal Shariat Court ruled that deatl was the only punishment for blasphemy. Pakistan's continuing poor international image. Intolerance and violence received eneourugement during Zia-ul-Haq's regime, but are also rooted at least partly in the frustrations arising from the poor electoral performance III' the religious parties, although more extreme groups than the JUI,.

Il1P or II have been behind the spiralling sectarian violence. The II-. The Lahore High Court in December also acquitted another thristian who had been consigned to death row by a sessions court since November Alulladis as well as Christians have often been brought to court under the so-called IIll1sphemy Ordinance on the basis of a single complaint. This provided for three years' imprisonment for the use of epithets and nctising of rights peculiar to Islam by non-Muslims.

Cases have been brought even on issues as wearing a ring inscribed with Quranic verses. For further details of the episode see Herald, May Internet Edition , 12 February A number of leading local policemen had been suspended following an earlier incident 17 January in which a Bible had been desecrated.

The extent of the damage and the , of petrol bombs and grenades confirmed the suspicion of police involvement. Dawn Internet Edition , 9 February The most prominent figure from the Islamic parties, Qazi Hussain Ahmed of the 11, failed to secure election from both the two National Assembly seats he contested.

The 11 boycotted the February polls ostensibly because of the caretaker Government's lack of progress with the accountability process. Those religio-political parties which did contest did no better than before. Maulana Fazlur Rahman of the JUI had not only to contend with voter apathy, but had the indignity of being opposed by a voluptuous actress, Musarrat Shaheen, in his Dera Ismail Khan constituency. This electoral rejection of the religious parties has received much less publicity in the West than the dangers of fanaticism.

Indeed, one of its founder members, Asma Jehangir who is the present Chairperson of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan acted as defence counsel in the celebrated Salamat Masih and Rahmat Masih blasphemy case. Violent episodes such as the retaliation for the Babri Masjid's destruction in India have instead grabbed the headlines.

The system of separate electorates" implemented during Zia's time has decoupled minority legislators from their constituents and thereby further reduced their avenues of redress. Islamisation and sectarian conflict have diverted attention from the role of pirs in post Pakistani politics. A number of them however, not least Pir Pagaro who is reputed to have a million followers, have.

In Provincial Assemblies it is the whole of the province. Christians and Hindus have four seats each in the National Assembly, while other non-Muslim communities have one.

Ahmadis have not contested their reserved National and Provincial Assembly seats because of the way this would compromise their religious self-identity.

The leading Ilgure of the Sindhi nationalists G. Syed himself came from a pir fnmily and founded the Bazm-e-Soofia-e-Sindh organisation which orwnnised literary conferences and urs at the shrines of saints. Some followers claimed that his idea of Sindhu Desh Sindhi homeland was mystically inspired. At the other end of the spectrum of politics in Sinoh, Altaf Hussain, the leader of the MQM, is so highly venerated hy his mohajir followers that he is referred to as 'Pir.

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, despite his image as a modern populist leader Nought support from the pirs. Added to the continuing problem of Islamisation is the ongoing influence of feudal politics.

Although Zulfikar Ali Bhutto promised to nholish feudalism and introduce a more comprehensive land reform Ihan Ayub Khan, the political dominance of the landed elites has contlnued.

Feudal power relations have persisted in Punjab's south western region and according to government records even after the and land reforms, large landholders with farms of 50 acres and above Nlill owned 18 per cent of land in this area.

Bhutto himself turned Ii the landowners in the elections. The power of the wadero" hus remained a constant feature of Sindh' s politics. Regional and national parties alike have drawn their leadership from this class in the Sindhispeaking areas. When Zia undertook the civilianisation of his martial law regime, his hand-picked Prime Minister Muhammad Khan Junejo from a prominent landed family of Sindh. A growing criticism of 'feudal' influence has centred around the. Syed, Pakistan: For details of Bhutto's 'veneration', see W.

Richter, 'Pakistan' in M.

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Ayoob ed. Dawn Overseas Weekly, Karachi, week ending 4 January Wadero estates in Sindh can be anything up to 50, acres in extent.

Even after the imposition of a wealth tax in , commentators pointed out that it raised only the paltry sum of Rs. The influential English-language monthly Newsline, in an issue entitled 'The Great Tax Scandal' ,48 made much of the fact that the Pakistan President along with the chief ministers of Sindh and Balochistan did not pay any income tax because of their exemption as landowners.

Such articulate spokesmen of the agriculturalist lobby as Shah Mehmood Qureshi retorted that the landowners were already paying huge sums in 'implicit taxation' through the agricultural support price system which fixed produce prices well below the international market level.

The growing disorder which undermined Benazir Bhuttos second government in the summer of was directly rooted in the swingeing tax increases of Rs.

Even the nominal provincial taxation on agricultural wealth which existed in Sindh, the Frontier and Balochistan was opposed in Punjab. The manufacturing-and service sectors have grown rapidly and become major employers. The production of' sugar" and.

During the first four decades of independence, the number. Duties were increased on such items as beverages and cigarettes. The clouds around the silver lining of his earlier assessment included the perennial trade deficits,56 budget deficits Rs. As a result of poor'agrIcultural yields, the country has been increasingly forced to import wheat and vegetables to feed its burgeoning population.

Even after the loss of its eastern province, Pakistan's population of million at the beginning of the s was over 50 per cent higher than that of four decades earlier. From Crisis to Crisis, Asian Survey 36, no. Kennedy ed. P" Despite the fragmentary data which is available, it is clear that the natural increase in population has resulted from the birth rate declining much more slowly than the death rate.The areas which formed British Balochistan abutted the frontier with Afghanistan and had been brought under imperial sway for strategic reasons from onwards.

I 44ff. The pirs' popular religious influence, however, provides them with immense moral and temporal authority, and many have also acquired large landholdings. Socio-economic change together with the separation of East Pakistan and the international rise of Islamic reassertion have had a profound impact on Pakistan's search for political stability.

Ellis and Z. This exacerbated the effect of the loss of the US military prop. This provided for three years' imprisonment for the use of epithets and nctising of rights peculiar to Islam by non-Muslims.